supabase-audit-auth-users

Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities through various authentication endpoints.

yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills366 installsMITSynced Aug 26

Works with

Claude CodeCursorCodex CLIGitHub CopilotGemini CLI
---
name: supabase-audit-auth-users
description: Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities through various authentication endpoints.
license: MIT
---

# User Enumeration Audit

> πŸ”΄ **CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED**
>
> You MUST write to context files **AS YOU GO**, not just at the end.
> - Write to `.sb-pentest-context.json` **IMMEDIATELY after each endpoint tested**
> - Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log` **BEFORE and AFTER each test**
> - **DO NOT** wait until the skill completes to update files
> - If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved
>
> **This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.**

This skill tests for user enumeration vulnerabilities in authentication flows.

## When to Use This Skill

- To check if user existence can be detected
- To test login, signup, and recovery flows for information leakage
- As part of authentication security audit
- Before production deployment

## Prerequisites

- Supabase URL and anon key available
- Auth endpoints accessible

## What is User Enumeration?

User enumeration occurs when an application reveals whether a user account exists through:

| Vector | Indicator |
|--------|-----------|
| Different error messages | "User not found" vs "Wrong password" |
| Response timing | Fast for non-existent, slow for existing |
| Response codes | 404 vs 401 |
| Signup response | "Email already registered" |

## Why It Matters

| Risk | Impact |
|------|--------|
| Targeted attacks | Attackers know valid accounts |
| Phishing | Confirm targets have accounts |
| Credential stuffing | Reduce attack scope |
| Privacy | Reveal user presence |

## Tests Performed

| Endpoint | Test Method |
|----------|-------------|
| `/auth/v1/signup` | Try registering existing email |
| `/auth/v1/token` | Try login with various emails |
| `/auth/v1/recover` | Try password reset |
| `/auth/v1/otp` | Try OTP for various emails |

## Usage

### Basic Enumeration Test

```
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities
```

### Test Specific Endpoint

```
Test login endpoint for user enumeration
```

## Output Format

```
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 USER ENUMERATION AUDIT
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

 Project: abc123def.supabase.co

 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Signup Endpoint (/auth/v1/signup)
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 Test: POST with known existing email
 Response for existing: "User already registered"
 Response for new email: User object returned

 Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE

 The response clearly indicates if an email is registered.

 Exploitation:
 ```bash
 curl -X POST https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/signup \
   -H "apikey: [anon-key]" \
   -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
   -d '{"email": "target@example.com", "password": "test123"}'

 # If user exists: {"msg": "User already registered"}
 # If new user: User created or confirmation needed
 ```

 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Login Endpoint (/auth/v1/token)
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 Test: POST with different email scenarios

 Existing email, wrong password:
 β”œβ”€β”€ Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
 β”œβ”€β”€ Time: 245ms
 └── Code: 400

 Non-existing email:
 β”œβ”€β”€ Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
 β”œβ”€β”€ Time: 52ms ← Significantly faster!
 └── Code: 400

 Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING

 Although the error message is the same, the response
 time is noticeably different:
 β”œβ”€β”€ Existing user: ~200-300ms (password hashing)
 └── Non-existing: ~50-100ms (no hash check)

 Timing Attack PoC:
 ```python
 import requests
 import time

 def check_user(email):
     start = time.time()
     requests.post(
         'https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/token',
         params={'grant_type': 'password'},
         json={'email': email, 'password': 'wrong'},
         headers={'apikey': '[anon-key]'}
     )
     elapsed = time.time() - start
     return elapsed > 0.15  # Threshold

 exists = check_user('target@example.com')
 ```

 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Password Recovery (/auth/v1/recover)
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 Test: POST recovery request for different emails

 Existing email:
 β”œβ”€β”€ Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"}
 β”œβ”€β”€ Time: 1250ms (email actually sent)
 └── Code: 200

 Non-existing email:
 β”œβ”€β”€ Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"}
 β”œβ”€β”€ Time: 85ms ← Much faster (no email sent)
 └── Code: 200

 Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING

 Same message, but timing reveals existence.
 Existing users trigger actual email sending (~1s+).

 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Magic Link / OTP (/auth/v1/otp)
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 Test: Request OTP for different emails

 Existing email:
 β”œβ”€β”€ Response: {"message": "OTP sent"}
 β”œβ”€β”€ Time: 1180ms
 └── Code: 200

 Non-existing email:
 β”œβ”€β”€ Response: {"error": "User not found"}
 β”œβ”€β”€ Time: 95ms
 └── Code: 400

 Status: πŸ”΄ P1 - DIRECTLY ENUMERABLE

 The error message explicitly states user doesn't exist.

 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Summary
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 Endpoints Tested: 4
 Enumerable: 4 (100%)

 Vulnerability Severity:
 β”œβ”€β”€ πŸ”΄ P1: OTP endpoint (explicit message)
 β”œβ”€β”€ 🟠 P2: Signup endpoint (explicit message)
 β”œβ”€β”€ 🟠 P2: Login endpoint (timing attack)
 └── 🟠 P2: Recovery endpoint (timing attack)

 Overall User Enumeration Risk: HIGH

 An attacker can determine if any email address
 has an account in your application.

 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Mitigation Recommendations
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 1. CONSISTENT RESPONSES
    Return identical messages for all scenarios:
    "If an account exists, you will receive an email"

 2. CONSISTENT TIMING
    Add artificial delay to normalize response times:
    ```typescript
    const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1000; // 1 second
    const start = Date.now();
    // ... perform auth operation ...
    const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
      Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
    ));
    return response;
    ```

 3. RATE LIMITING
    Already enabled: 3/hour per IP
    Consider per-email rate limiting too.

 4. CAPTCHA
    Add CAPTCHA for repeated attempts:
    - After 3 failed logins
    - For password recovery
    - For signup

 5. MONITORING
    Alert on enumeration patterns:
    - Many requests with different emails
    - Sequential email patterns (user1@, user2@, ...)

═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
```

## Timing Analysis

The skill measures response times to detect timing-based enumeration:

```
Existing user:
β”œβ”€β”€ Password hash verification: ~200-300ms
β”œβ”€β”€ Email sending: ~1000-2000ms
└── Database lookup: ~5-20ms

Non-existing user:
β”œβ”€β”€ No hash verification: 0ms
β”œβ”€β”€ No email sending: 0ms
└── Database lookup: ~5-20ms (not found)
```

Threshold detection:
- Difference > 100ms: Possible timing leak
- Difference > 500ms: Definite timing leak

## Context Output

```json
{
  "user_enumeration": {
    "timestamp": "2025-01-31T13:30:00Z",
    "endpoints_tested": 4,
    "vulnerabilities": [
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
        "severity": "P1",
        "type": "explicit_message",
        "existing_response": "OTP sent",
        "missing_response": "User not found"
      },
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/signup",
        "severity": "P2",
        "type": "explicit_message",
        "existing_response": "User already registered",
        "missing_response": "User created"
      },
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
        "severity": "P2",
        "type": "timing_attack",
        "existing_time_ms": 245,
        "missing_time_ms": 52
      },
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/recover",
        "severity": "P2",
        "type": "timing_attack",
        "existing_time_ms": 1250,
        "missing_time_ms": 85
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

## Mitigation Code Examples

### Consistent Response Time

```typescript
// Edge Function with normalized timing
const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1500; // 1.5 seconds

Deno.serve(async (req) => {
  const start = Date.now();

  try {
    // Perform actual auth operation
    const result = await handleAuth(req);

    // Normalize response time
    const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
      Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
    ));

    return new Response(JSON.stringify(result));
  } catch (error) {
    // Same timing for errors
    const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
      Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
    ));

    // Generic error message
    return new Response(JSON.stringify({
      message: "Check your email if you have an account"
    }));
  }
});
```

### Generic Error Messages

```typescript
// Don't reveal user existence
async function requestPasswordReset(email: string) {
  // Always return success message
  const response = {
    message: "If an account with that email exists, " +
             "you will receive a password reset link."
  };

  // Perform actual reset in background (don't await)
  supabase.auth.resetPasswordForEmail(email).catch(() => {});

  return response;
}
```

## MANDATORY: Progressive Context File Updates

⚠️ **This skill MUST update tracking files PROGRESSIVELY during execution, NOT just at the end.**

### Critical Rule: Write As You Go

**DO NOT** batch all writes at the end. Instead:

1. **Before testing each endpoint** β†’ Log the action to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`
2. **After each timing measurement** β†’ Immediately update `.sb-pentest-context.json`
3. **After each enumeration vector found** β†’ Log the finding immediately

This ensures that if the skill is interrupted, crashes, or times out, all findings up to that point are preserved.

### Required Actions (Progressive)

1. **Update `.sb-pentest-context.json`** with results:
   ```json
   {
     "user_enumeration": {
       "timestamp": "...",
       "endpoints_tested": 4,
       "vulnerabilities": [ ... ]
     }
   }
   ```

2. **Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`**:
   ```
   [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [START] Testing user enumeration
   [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [FINDING] P1: OTP endpoint enumerable
   [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [CONTEXT_UPDATED] .sb-pentest-context.json updated
   ```

3. **If files don't exist**, create them before writing.

**FAILURE TO UPDATE CONTEXT FILES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.**

## MANDATORY: Evidence Collection

πŸ“ **Evidence Directory:** `.sb-pentest-evidence/05-auth-audit/enumeration-tests/`

### Evidence Files to Create

| File | Content |
|------|---------|
| `enumeration-tests/login-timing.json` | Login endpoint timing analysis |
| `enumeration-tests/recovery-timing.json` | Recovery endpoint timing |
| `enumeration-tests/otp-enumeration.json` | OTP endpoint message analysis |

### Evidence Format

```json
{
  "evidence_id": "AUTH-ENUM-001",
  "timestamp": "2025-01-31T11:00:00Z",
  "category": "auth-audit",
  "type": "user_enumeration",

  "tests": [
    {
      "endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
      "test_type": "timing_attack",
      "severity": "P2",

      "existing_user_test": {
        "email": "[KNOWN_EXISTING]@example.com",
        "response_time_ms": 245,
        "response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
      },

      "nonexisting_user_test": {
        "email": "definitely-not-exists@example.com",
        "response_time_ms": 52,
        "response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
      },

      "timing_difference_ms": 193,
      "result": "ENUMERABLE",
      "impact": "Can determine if email has account via timing"
    },
    {
      "endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
      "test_type": "explicit_message",
      "severity": "P1",

      "existing_user_response": {"message": "OTP sent"},
      "nonexisting_user_response": {"error": "User not found"},

      "result": "ENUMERABLE",
      "impact": "Error message explicitly reveals user existence"
    }
  ],

  "curl_commands": [
    "# Timing test - existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"existing@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'",
    "# Timing test - non-existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"nonexistent@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'"
  ]
}
```

## Related Skills

- `supabase-audit-auth-config` β€” Full auth configuration
- `supabase-audit-auth-signup` β€” Signup flow testing
- `supabase-report` β€” Include in final report

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