supabase-extract-service-key

CRITICAL - Detect if the Supabase service_role key is leaked in client-side code. This is a P0 severity issue.

yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills365 installsMITSynced Aug 26

Works with

Claude CodeCursorCodex CLIGitHub CopilotGemini CLI
---
name: supabase-extract-service-key
description: CRITICAL - Detect if the Supabase service_role key is leaked in client-side code. This is a P0 severity issue.
license: MIT
---

# Supabase Service Key Detection

> πŸ”΄ **CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED**
>
> You MUST write to context files **AS YOU GO**, not just at the end.
> - Write to `.sb-pentest-context.json` **IMMEDIATELY after each discovery**
> - Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log` **BEFORE and AFTER each action**
> - **DO NOT** wait until the skill completes to update files
> - If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved
>
> **This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.**

This skill detects if the **service_role key** (admin key) is accidentally exposed in client-side code.

## When to Use This Skill

- As part of every security audit (this is critical)
- When reviewing code before production deployment
- After detecting Supabase usage to check for this common mistake

## Prerequisites

- Target application accessible
- Supabase detection completed (auto-invokes if needed)

## Why This Is Critical

The **service_role key** bypasses ALL Row Level Security (RLS) policies. If exposed:

| Impact | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| πŸ”΄ Full DB Access | Read/write/delete all data in all tables |
| πŸ”΄ Auth Bypass | Access all user data without authentication |
| πŸ”΄ Storage Access | Read/write all files in all buckets |
| πŸ”΄ User Impersonation | Generate tokens for any user |

**This is a P0 (Critical) finding that requires immediate action.**

## Service Key vs Anon Key

| Aspect | Anon Key | Service Key |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| Role claim | `"role": "anon"` | `"role": "service_role"` |
| RLS | βœ… Respects RLS | ❌ Bypasses RLS |
| Client-side | βœ… Expected | ❌ NEVER |
| Server-side | βœ… Can use | βœ… Should use |

## Detection Patterns

The skill searches for:

### 1. Key with service_role Claim

```javascript
// Decoded JWT payload contains:
{
  "role": "service_role",  // ❌ CRITICAL if in client code
  "iss": "supabase",
  "ref": "abc123def"
}
```

### 2. Variable Names

```javascript
// Common naming patterns
SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
SUPABASE_ADMIN_KEY
SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY
SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
```

### 3. Accidental Exposure

```javascript
// Sometimes exposed alongside anon key
const keys = {
  anon: 'eyJ...',
  service: 'eyJ...'  // ❌ Should not be here
}
```

## Usage

### Basic Check

```
Check for service key leak on https://myapp.example.com
```

### Deep Scan

```
Deep scan for service key exposure on https://myapp.example.com
```

## Output Format

### No Service Key Found (Good)

```
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 SERVICE KEY CHECK
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

 Status: βœ… No service_role key detected in client code

 Scanned:
 β”œβ”€β”€ HTML source: Clean
 β”œβ”€β”€ JavaScript bundles: 5 files, 2.3MB analyzed
 β”œβ”€β”€ Inline scripts: 12 blocks checked
 └── Source maps: Not exposed (good)

 JWT Analysis:
 └── 1 key found, confirmed role=anon (safe)

 Result: PASS - No critical key exposure
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
```

### Service Key FOUND (Critical)

```
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 πŸ”΄ CRITICAL: SERVICE KEY EXPOSED
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

 Severity: P0 - CRITICAL
 Status: ❌ service_role key found in client-side code!

 ⚠️  IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED ⚠️

 Exposed Key:
 eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJzdXBh
 YmFzZSIsInJlZiI6ImFiYzEyM2RlZiIsInJvbGUiOiJzZXJ2aWNlX3
 JvbGUiLCJpYXQiOjE2NDAwMDAwMDAsImV4cCI6MTk1NTM2MDAwMH0
 .xxxxxxxxxxxxx

 Location:
 └── /static/js/admin.chunk.js (line 89)
     const SUPABASE_KEY = 'eyJhbG...'  // Used in createClient()

 Decoded Payload:
 β”œβ”€β”€ role: service_role ← CRITICAL
 β”œβ”€β”€ ref: abc123def
 └── exp: 2031-12-20

 Impact Assessment:
 β”œβ”€β”€ πŸ”΄ Full database access possible
 β”œβ”€β”€ πŸ”΄ All RLS policies bypassed
 β”œβ”€β”€ πŸ”΄ All user data exposed
 └── πŸ”΄ All storage buckets accessible

 ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 IMMEDIATE REMEDIATION STEPS
 ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

 1. ROTATE THE KEY NOW
    β†’ Supabase Dashboard > Settings > API > Regenerate service_role key

 2. REMOVE FROM CLIENT CODE
    β†’ Delete the key from your source code
    β†’ Redeploy your application

 3. AUDIT FOR ABUSE
    β†’ Check Supabase logs for unauthorized access
    β†’ Review database for unexpected changes

 4. USE EDGE FUNCTIONS
    β†’ Move privileged operations to Edge Functions
    β†’ Client calls Edge Function, which uses service key server-side

 Documentation:
 β†’ https://supabase.com/docs/guides/api/api-keys
 β†’ https://supabase.com/docs/guides/functions

═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
```

## Context Output

Saved to `.sb-pentest-context.json`:

```json
{
  "findings": [
    {
      "id": "SERVICE_KEY_EXPOSED",
      "severity": "P0",
      "title": "Service Role Key Exposed in Client Code",
      "description": "The service_role key was found in client-side JavaScript",
      "location": {
        "file": "/static/js/admin.chunk.js",
        "line": 89
      },
      "evidence": {
        "key_prefix": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI...",
        "role": "service_role",
        "project_ref": "abc123def"
      },
      "remediation": {
        "immediate": "Rotate key in Supabase Dashboard",
        "long_term": "Move to Edge Functions",
        "docs": "https://supabase.com/docs/guides/api/api-keys"
      }
    }
  ],
  "supabase": {
    "service_key_exposed": true,
    "service_key_location": "/static/js/admin.chunk.js:89"
  }
}
```

## Source Maps Check

The skill also checks for exposed source maps that might reveal keys:

```
Source Maps Analysis:
β”œβ”€β”€ main.js.map: ❌ Exposed (may contain secrets)
β”œβ”€β”€ vendor.js.map: ❌ Exposed
└── Recommendation: Disable source maps in production

To check source maps content:
β†’ Add .map to JS URLs: /static/js/main.js.map
```

## Common Causes

| Cause | Solution |
|-------|----------|
| Wrong env variable | Use `NEXT_PUBLIC_` only for anon key |
| Copy-paste error | Double-check which key you're using |
| Debug code left in | Remove before production build |
| Misconfigured bundler | Ensure service key env vars are not included |

## Remediation Code Examples

### Before (Wrong)

```javascript
// ❌ WRONG - Service key in client
import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'

const supabase = createClient(
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL,
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY  // ❌ NEVER DO THIS
)
```

### After (Correct)

```javascript
// βœ… CORRECT - Only anon key in client
import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'

const supabase = createClient(
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL,
  process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY  // βœ… Safe for client
)

// For privileged operations, call an Edge Function:
const { data } = await supabase.functions.invoke('admin-action', {
  body: { action: 'delete-user', userId: '123' }
})
```

### Edge Function (Server-Side)

```typescript
// supabase/functions/admin-action/index.ts
import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'

Deno.serve(async (req) => {
  // βœ… Service key only on server
  const supabase = createClient(
    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL'),
    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')  // βœ… Safe on server
  )

  // Perform privileged operation
  // ...
})
```

## MANDATORY: Progressive Context File Updates

⚠️ **This skill MUST update tracking files PROGRESSIVELY during execution, NOT just at the end.**

### Critical Rule: Write As You Go

**DO NOT** batch all writes at the end. Instead:

1. **Before starting any action** β†’ Log the action to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`
2. **After each discovery** β†’ Immediately update `.sb-pentest-context.json`
3. **After each significant step** β†’ Log completion to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`

This ensures that if the skill is interrupted, crashes, or times out, all findings up to that point are preserved.

### Required Actions (Progressive)

1. **Update `.sb-pentest-context.json`** with findings:
   ```json
   {
     "supabase": {
       "service_key_exposed": true/false,
       "service_key_location": "path:line"
     },
     "findings": [
       {
         "id": "SERVICE_KEY_EXPOSED",
         "severity": "P0",
         "title": "Service Role Key Exposed",
         ...
       }
     ]
   }
   ```

2. **Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`**:
   ```
   [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-extract-service-key] [START] Checking for service key exposure
   [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-extract-service-key] [CRITICAL] Service key EXPOSED at path:line
   [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-extract-service-key] [CONTEXT_UPDATED] .sb-pentest-context.json updated
   ```

3. **If files don't exist**, create them before writing.

**FAILURE TO UPDATE CONTEXT FILES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.**

## MANDATORY: Evidence Collection

πŸ“ **Evidence Directory:** `.sb-pentest-evidence/02-extraction/service-key-exposure/`

### Evidence Files to Create (if service key found)

| File | Content |
|------|---------|
| `service-key-exposure/location.txt` | File path and line number |
| `service-key-exposure/decoded-payload.json` | Decoded JWT proving it's service_role |
| `service-key-exposure/code-snippet.txt` | Code context (redacted) |

### Evidence Format (P0 Finding)

```json
{
  "evidence_id": "EXT-SVC-001",
  "timestamp": "2025-01-31T10:10:00Z",
  "category": "extraction",
  "type": "service_key_exposure",
  "severity": "P0",
  "finding_id": "P0-001",

  "key_data": {
    "key_prefix": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI...",
    "key_suffix": "...xxxx",
    "role": "service_role"
  },

  "decoded_payload": {
    "iss": "supabase",
    "ref": "abc123def",
    "role": "service_role",
    "iat": "2021-12-20T00:00:00Z",
    "exp": "2031-12-20T00:00:00Z"
  },

  "location": {
    "file": "/static/js/admin.chunk.js",
    "line": 89,
    "context": "const SUPABASE_KEY = 'eyJhbG...' // [REDACTED]"
  },

  "impact": {
    "rls_bypass": true,
    "full_db_access": true,
    "auth_users_access": true,
    "storage_access": true
  },

  "curl_command": "curl -X GET 'https://abc123def.supabase.co/rest/v1/users' -H 'apikey: [SERVICE_KEY]' -H 'Authorization: Bearer [SERVICE_KEY]'"
}
```

### Add to timeline.md (P0)

```markdown
## [TIMESTAMP] - πŸ”΄ P0 CRITICAL: Service Role Key Exposed
- Service role key found in client-side code
- Location: [file]:[line]
- Impact: Full database access, RLS bypass
- Evidence: `02-extraction/service-key-exposure/`
- **IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED**
```

## Related Skills

- `supabase-extract-anon-key` β€” Extract the (expected) anon key
- `supabase-audit-tables-read` β€” Test what data is accessible
- `supabase-report` β€” Generate full report including this finding

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