security-threat-model
Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools, innerHTML/eval/exec, dependency upgrades, or cross-tenant access.
Works with
--- name: security-threat-model description: Threat-model product features, APIs, data flows, secrets, permissions, supply-chain changes, auth boundaries, and risky code paths before or during implementation. Use when touching authentication, authorization, payments, secrets, user data, uploads, webhooks, admin tools, innerHTML/eval/exec, dependency upgrades, or cross-tenant access. license: MIT --- # Security Threat Model ## Purpose Use this skill before implementing or approving security-sensitive changes. It complements `auth-security` and `server-security` by mapping assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and concrete controls. ## Scope First Identify: 1. Assets: credentials, tokens, user data, tenant data, money movement, admin actions. 2. Actors: anonymous user, authenticated user, tenant admin, internal operator, compromised dependency. 3. Trust boundaries: browser/server, service/service, tenant/tenant, CI/runtime, third-party callbacks. 4. Entry points: API routes, CLI commands, jobs, webhooks, uploads, config files. 5. Existing controls: validation, authz, rate limits, audit logs, secret storage. ## Threat Checklist Check at least: - Spoofing: can an identity, tenant, callback, or service be forged? - Tampering: can payloads, configs, migrations, artifacts, or logs be altered? - Repudiation: is there an audit trail for sensitive actions? - Information disclosure: can secrets, PII, logs, or tenant data leak? - Denial of service: can expensive paths be amplified? - Elevation of privilege: can user or service permissions expand? - Supply chain: can dependencies, scripts, CI, or generated files introduce risk? ## Required Controls Every finding needs one of: - preventive control in production code, - detective control with alerting, - compensating manual control with owner and expiry, - explicit accepted risk with rationale. Do not accept "warn and continue" for authz, secrets, tenant isolation, injection, or payment/security-critical failures. ## Output Shape ```text scope: assets: trust_boundaries: entry_points: threats: required_controls: tests_or_probes: residual_risks: review_gate: ``` For implementation work, include exact files and verification commands that prove the controls are active.
More API Design skills
lark-event
larksuite/cli
Lark/Feishu real-time event listening / subscribing / consuming: stream events as NDJSON via `lark-cli event consume <EventKey>` (covers IM messages/reactions/chat changes, Approval status changes, Task updates, VC meeting started/joined/ended, Minutes generated, Whiteboard updated, etc.). Use for Lark bots, real-time message processing, long-running subscribers, streaming webhook/push handlers. Supports `--max-events` / `--timeout` bounded runs and a stderr ready-marker contract — designed for AI agents running as subprocesses.
lark-contact
larksuite/cli
飞书 / Lark 通讯录:按姓名 / 邮箱解析成 open_id,或按 open_id 反查姓名 / 部门 / 邮箱 / 联系方式 / 个人状态 / 签名,以及按关键词搜索当前用户可见的机器人 / 智能体(agent)。当用户提到一个名字要下一步发消息 / 排日程,或拿到 open_id 想查具体信息时使用。不负责部门树遍历、按部门列员工、组织架构图,这类需求走原生 OpenAPI。
lark-openapi-explorer
larksuite/cli
飞书/Lark 原生 OpenAPI 探索:从官方文档库中挖掘未经 CLI 封装的原生 OpenAPI 接口。当用户的需求无法被现有 lark-* skill 或 lark-cli 已注册命令满足,需要查找并调用原生飞书 OpenAPI 时使用。

